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MEAT TRACEABILITY: ARE U.S. CONSUMERS
WILLING TO PAY FOR IT?

David L. Dickinson and DeeVon Bailey
There are huge gaps from the farm to the processing plants. No one knows where
the cows are coming from . . .. Trace forward from the processing plant is
supposed to be accurate, but no one knows for sure. "-Caroline Smith DeWaal,
Food Safety Director for the Center for Science in the Public Interest.

ABSTRACT

This article reports the results from a series of laboratory auction markets in which
consumers bid on meat characteristics. The characteristics examined include meat traceability
(i.e., the ability to trace the retail meat back to the farm or animal or origin), transparency (e.g.,
knowing that the meat was produced without growth hormones, or knowing the animal was
humanely treated), and extra assurances (e.g., extra meat safety assurances). This laboratory
study provides non-hypothetical bid data on U.S. consumer preferences for traceability,
transparency, and assurances (TTA) in red meat at a time when the U.S. currently lags other
countries in development ofTTA meat systems. Our results suggest that U.S. consumers would
be willing to pay for such TTA meat characteristics, and the magnitude of the consumer bids
suggest a likely profitable market for development of U.S. TTA systems.

MEAT TRACEABILITY: ARE U.S. CONSUMERS
WILLING TO PAY FOR IT?

Introduction

Recent research suggests the U.S. red meat system is falling behind many of its major
competitors and trading partners in terms oftraceability, transparency, and other quality
assurances (TTA) (Liddell and Bailey (2001)). In fact, the U.S. pork system ranks last,
according to Liddell and Bailey, when compared against the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark,
Canada, Japan, and AustralialNew Zealand for TTA. Traceability is sometimes called identity
preservation and is defined in Liddell and Bailey as the ability to track the inputs used to make
food products backward to their source at different levels of the marketing chain. Transparency
refers to the public availability of information on all of the rules, procedures, and practices used
to produce a food product at each level of the marketing chain (Baines and Davies (1998); Early
(1998)).1
Quality assurance has three key elements including managing hygiene to ensure food
safety, ensuring quality through grading and other measurements, and providing mechanisms for
product recalls (Early (1998); Baines (2001)). For example, the processes for ensuring hygiene
in the European Union (EU) red-meat system has focused on Hazard Analysis Critical Control
Point (HACCP) systems 2 at each point in the pork value chain beginning at the farm level.
Ensuring quality in red-meat system includes measurements of the intrinsic quality of a
carcass or product (tenderness, back fat, curing, etc.). Intrinsic quality measurements are
common to most government grading systems including the United States, its trading partners,
and competitors. However, the EU system also provides measures of the extrinsic qualities of
I Transparency requires published procedures that are publicly available and can be influenced by input from
stakeholder groups (Liddell and Bailey (2001».
2 Codex standards emphasize hygiene and fit well into the HACCP approach for ensuring food safety. ISO 9000
standards are private labeling schemes that certify practices and procedures for a wide range of products. Capmany
et al. (2000) indicate that the United States is also lagging other countries in the adopting ISO 9000 standards.
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red meat. Extrinsic qualities do not affect either food safety or the intrinsic qualities of the meat
product but may still affect the value of the product. Extrinsic qualities could include assurances
about animal welfare, environmental preservation, or other inputs or absence of inputs used to
produce the meat produce (Liddell and Bailey (2001); Baines (2001)).
TTA evolved initially in response to the perceived regulatory failure of European Union
(EU) governments to provide adequate information ton consumers during the EU BSE (bovine

spongiform encephalopathyt crisis (Baines and Davies (1998)). As a result, the EU has
developed systems that enhance the credence nature of attributes such as animal welfare and
even food safety issues such as BSE by filling the perceived information void inherent in
standard government grading practices with TT A.
This article presents initial evidence on U.S. consumers willingness to pay (WTP) for
TT A characteristics in beef and pork. We report the results from a series of controlled laboratory
experiments in which consumers bid in a (theoretically) demand-revealing auction on meat
sandwich upgrades. These WTP auctions, utilized first in Shogren et al. (1994b), generate
non-hypothetical data on consumer valuation of TTA attributes in meat and are a first step
towards identifying the potential U.S. market(s) for meat produced through a TTA system. We
find that consumers are willing to pay significant amounts of money to upgrade a sandwich to an
otherwise identical sandwich containing TT A attribute( s) meat. Furthermore, our results suggest
that the market for TTA beef may be broader than the market for TTA pork, as auction market

3 An example would be the assuring the absence of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in a product. ITA is
different than typical quality assurances and standardization in its scope (tracing throughout the market chain) and its
focus (certifies more than just food safety). For example, Codex standards emphasize hygiene. ISO 9000 standards
are private labeling schemes that certify practices and procedures for a wide range of products. ITA could serve as
a basis for ISO certification if private companies decided these types of certifications were desirable. Capmany et al.
(2000) indicate that the United States is also lagging other countries in the adoption of ISO 9000 standards.
4 Also known as "mad-cow" disease.

valuation of the latter is more sensitive to the specific demographic characteristics of the
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consumers. Part of the focus of our analysis is on what consumers are willing to pay for
extrinsic quality assurances because extrinsic characteristics are beyond the typical assurances
(food safety and intrinsic qualities) provided by public sector inspection and grading in the
United States (Baines and Davies (2000)).

Background on TTA

TTA is obtained through a system of records and certifications that allow a product to be
traced and certified back to different points in the food chain. Currently most U. S. red meat is
traceable from retail back to the processor but not to the farm or animal level. Establishing TTA
prior to processing would require a system that is currently not generally in place in the United
States. While the U. S. has been slow to adopt TTA standards and certifications, some countries
in the European Union (EU) and elsewhere have been developing TTA systems (Early (1998);
Baines and Davies (2000); Liddell and Bailey; Abbatemarico).
Red meat producers and processors in the United States should be concerned that the U.
S. system is lagging other countries in terms ofTTA for at least two reasons. First, consumers
have become increasingly concerned about the processes (inputs and methods) used to produce
food (e.g. Dorey; Nakamoto). Second, if competitors are able to differentiate their red meat
products as being superior to U. S. red meat products in terms ofTTA, the United States may
lose market share in its red meat export markets. For example, food safety concerns in Japan,
including the recent discovery of BSE, could potentially lead to heightened import restrictions
and regulations (Nakamoto). Japan is the United State's principal export market for red meat
and such concerns could eventually lead to a loss of U. S. market share if competitors such as
Canada, AustraliaINew Zealand, and Denmark are successful in convincing Japanese buyers that
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their products are "safer" than U. S. products because their system provides more TTA than the
U. S. system.
While TTA has not been a central issue in red meat markets in the United States, it has in
the EU and other countries during the past five years (e.g. Early (1998); Baines and Davies
(1997, 1998, and 2000) Liddell and Bailey). As a result, the EU systems have evolved at a faster
rate than the U. S. system. The consequences in the U. S. may not be felt immediately, but the
potential of the U. S. losing market share in red meat markets in the future exists if competitors
can successfully differentiate their products based on real or perceived food safety and quality
assurance characteristics that can be certified and traced (Bailey and Hayes).
Dr. John Wiemers, the chainnan of the U. S. Department of Agriculture's, Food Safety
and Inspection Service Interagency Committee on Animal Identification, has stated that red-meat
traceability systems will only be implemented in the United States if consumers are found to be
willing to pay for the additional costs to produce traceable products. This suggests that evidence
of consumer willingness to pay for TTA products is essential if TTA systems are to be developed
in the United States.
Economic research on issues relating to TTA is quite limited since these systems have
been evolving only within the past five years. The economic literature that exists dealing with
TTA focuses primarily on the aftermath of the BSE crisis in the United Kingdom. For example,
Palmer and Loader and Hobbs document the economic devastation to the British beef industry
resulting from the BSE scare.
Hobbs used transaction costs economics to examine the perceived value of tracing beef
cattle from the farm to the packer level (1996a) and between beef suppliers and retail outlets in
the UK (1996b). Her findings indicate that traceability is the most important characteristic

desired by large beef processors when purchasing cattle from farmers (l996a). Hobbs (1996b)
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also found that the ease of traceability ranked ahead of prices paid to processors as an important
characteristic to consider when supermarkets purchased meat. 5 Latouch, Rainelli, and
Vermersch reported that consumers in the Rennes area of France were willing to pay for
traceability. However, their study focused on only one issue, BSE, and did not deal with more
general issues relating to TTA. Verbeke et al. examined the attitudes of Belgian meat consumers
about pork and they argued that traceability systems would work best when coupled with efforts
to improve intrinsic qualities such as leanness, taste, and tenderness and the extrinsic quality of
healthiness. None of these studies provide information or data for U. S. consumers and all are
quite narrowly focused, typically dealing with only one issue such as BSE.
An examination of differences in worldwide consumer attitudes about TTA and the
market value they place on different TTA certifiable characteristics will eventually be essential
to identifying the optimal approach to improving TTA in the U. S. red meat system since U. S.
red meat is traded not only domestically but also internationally. However, in this study we
focus on the United States to ascertain if domestic consumers are willing to pay for TTA and
other meat characteristics that could be certifiable through TTA. If significant changes are made
in the U. S. red meat system to address TTA concerns, large investments will be needed to do so.
Recapturing these investments will require capturing a significant market share of the red meat
market for products featuring TTA characteristics. This will probably require a significant
penetration of domestic red meat markets as well as foreign ones. The controlled experiments
we use in this study generate non-hypothetical bid data on consumer WTP for TTA, and this
information is vital towards assessing whether the U. S. red meat system should consider
implementing TTA. A large-scale field experiment would be an effective but prohibitively
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However, Hobbs (l996b) found supermarkets' most important consideration to be consistent quality of products.
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costly way of conducting such research. As an alternative, the small-scale controlled laboratory
experiments described in the next section offer a cost effective way to generate initial data on
domestic consumer attitudes about WTP for TTA.

Experiments

Since data on TTA systems in the United States is not publicly available,6 we use the
laboratory market approach for eliciting individuals' WTP for food traceability and related
characteristics. Our experiments follow the basic design utilized in Shogren et al (l994b) for
eliciting bids to "upgrade" a meat sandwich. Subjects in the experiments are given a free lunch,
which includes a meat sandwich, along with $15 cash at the beginning of the one-hour
experiment. Subjects in the experiment are allowed to bid on what they would be willing to pay
to exchange or upgrade their existing sandwich for a sandwich with the meat described as having
one or more extra verifiable attributes. The upgrades we consider are based are 1) extra
assurance or information relating to the processes used to produce meat including animal
treatment (humane treatment procedures and lack of growth hormones used in production of the
meat),7 2) extra assurance of food safety (extra tests for e coli or salmonella for beef or pork,
respectively),8 3) the ability to trace the meat back to the farm of origin,9 and 4) all three
upgrades combined. The respective auction sandwiches are numbered as Sandwich 1, Sandwich
2, Sandwich 3, and Sandwich 4.
Subjects were recruited from four different demographic cohorts for the experiments.
The subjects were informed at recruitment that either beef or pork would be consumed as part of

Some TTA products have been developed by private companies in the United States. For example, Farmland
Industries has developed TTA products. The fact that a large fIrm like Farmland is developing TTA products
provides additional evidence that TTA systems and products are becoming more important in the United States and
should be studied.
7 This relates to the transparency or knowledge of the processes used to produce red meat.
6

the free lunch. Each experimental group consisted of 13-14 individuals on average. Eight total
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experiments were conducted, four experiments using ham sandwiches and four using roast beef
sandwiches. Experimental groups were recruited for the ham and beef experiments such that
students were one experimental group, faculty were a group, professional staff (e.g., accountants,
administrative personnel, etc) another group, and classified staff (e.g., maintenance workers,
buildings and grounds keepers, etc.) as the fourth distinct demographic group. We chose to
conduct experiments in groups of similar individuals for two reasons. First, it is often the case
that individuals of similar socio-demographic populations shop in similar locations, and so this
approach may help engage subjects in the auction process to the largest extent possible. 10
Secondly, ex paste controls for the experimental group can help uncover the potential importance
of consumer demographics in estimating the market potential for traceable food products.
Once the experimental subjects arrived, they were seated with the free lunch in front of
them, given the $15 cash up front, and told to await instruction before unwrapping the lunch
sandwich. Subjects had hardcopy instructions of the experiment, the instructions were also
explained orally, and all clarification questions were answered prior to commencement of the
experiment. The auction format was such that subjects would place a bid to upgrade their
existing sandwich to one of the four auction sandwiches, and the auction rules were those of a
(theoretically demand-revealing) second-price sealed-bid auction. I I There were no differences in
appearance of any of the sandwiches, which were visually inspected by each subject prior to
bidding. The instructions clearly explained the different verifiable meat attributes in each

This relates to the assurance part of TTA since actual tests and guarantees are made.
This is the traceability portion of TTA.
10 Subject engagement in the auction was one reason behind the use of the random nth -price auction in Shogren et al.
(2001).
11 Shogren et al (1994a) examine second-price, random nth price, and combinatorial auction rules and fmd that
average bids in such food auction experiments are insensitive to the auction format.
8
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auction sandwich (see the Appendix for the text of the instructions).12 Unlike the auctions in
Shogren et al (1994b), subject bids are not truncated at zero, although we expect that individuals
would place positive value on the attributes we study in this article. 13
Bids from each subject were taken in turn for each auction sandwich, and this constituted
one round of the auction. Ten total rounds were conducted to allow for bid stabilization (see
Hayes et al (1995), and Shogren et al (1994b )), and market price information (i.e., the second
highest bid) for each sandwich was presented prior to eliciting the next round's bid for that
sandwich. Subjects were aware that a random draw at the end of the 10th round would determine
which of the four simultaneous auctions would be binding-no subject would end up consuming
more than one sandwich in the experiment. 14 A second random draw determined which of the 10
rounds would be binding. Subjects were therefore fully aware prior to starting the first auction
round that there was a uniform chance that any round for any auction sandwich might be the
binding auction, and the subjects reported no confusion over the understanding of these
procedures. After this second random draw, the appropriate auction was consummated by the
winning subject paying the second highest bid amount to exchange hislher original sandwich for
the auction sandwich. .Note that only one auction winner per experimental group consumes an
auction sandwich. All subjects were then allowed/required to consume their sandwiches prior to
leaving the experiment with their experiment cash.

12 The experiments involved no deceit as the auction sandwiches were truly and verifiably different in the meat they
contained. Imported ham from Denmark was used for the traceable (and related characteristics) ham, and one of the
Utah State University fanns was used to trace the roast beef (as well as to conduct extra safety tests and verify
humane animal treatment).
13 While it is highly unlikely that negative bid possibilities would significantly affect the average willingness-to-pay
data for items generally viewed as upgrades from a baseline product, this is not to say that negative bids might be
much more likely for other food attributes that are not necessarily considered "goods" (e.g., radiated meat). In our
experiments, only a small minority of the subjects every submitted negative bids, and these subjects often did this
only in the early auction rounds-these rounds are not included in the Table 1 analysis of the data.

Results
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The main results of average bid behavior for beef and pork are highlighted in Figures 1
and 2, respectively. While the magnitudes of the average bids are important, our main discussion
will involve comparisons of bids for different attributes of the same type of meat and for the
same attribute for different types of meat. As do Hayes et al (1995), we consider the magnitudes
of the average bids more as an upper bound on bids due to the nature of the one-day experiment.
Nonetheless, it is apparent that the average subject is willing to pay nontrivial amounts of money
to upgrade the meat in a sandwich valued at approximately $3.00. Average willingness to pay
(averaged across all subjects and all rounds) to upgrade the roast beef sandwich is $0.23 to add
basic traceability, $0.50 to add assurances on animal treatment, $0.63 to add extra assurances of
food safety, and $1.06 to upgrade the sandwich to one in which the roast beef contains all three
upgrades. For pork, the same respective upgrades were valued on average at $0.50, $0.53, $0.59,
and $1.14.
From Figure 1 we see that, while traceability for beef products itself may be valued,
consumers place an even larger value on specific attributes that might be verifiable within a
traceable meat system. Bids for beef traceability are statistically significantly lower than bids for
animal treatment assurances and bids for increased food safety (p<.Ol for the two-tailed
nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test of means using average bids in each round as the
observation of interest). 15 Similarly, among the specific attributes of food safety and animal
treatment, bids for food safety are higher than those for animal treatment (p<.05). Subjects are

14 While some may [md elicitation of bids on four products at once cumbersome and/or confusing for the subjects,
Melton et al. elicit simultaneous bids on eight different pork chops after noting that consumers regularly evaluate
from six to eight packages of a particular cut of meat on display at once.
IS The Mann-Whitney nonparametric test of means places no distribution assumptions on the subject bids, although
it does assume that average subject bids are independent across rounds for each sandwich auction. The basic results
are, however, consistent with the parametric regression results shown in Table 1 in which we use each subject's
average bid across the [mal five auction rounds as the dependent variable.
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also willing to pay significantly more for beef that combines all three of these meat attributes in a
single product (p<.O 1 for each comparison), although the average bid for the "everything"
sandwich is less than the sum of the bids for individual meat attributes. That is, subjects display
a decreasing marginal willingness-to-pay for additional attributes. Similar results are to be found
by analyzing market price data, which is descriptive of the subjects' highest willingness-to-pay
for comparative valuations of the food attributes.
Figure 2 shows the comparable aggregate bidding data for the ham sandwich upgrade.
The bid data for each auction sandwich are not as neatly ordered for ham as they are for beef, but
subjects are still willing to pay significantly more for food safety than for animal treatment
assurances (p<.1 0 for the two-tailed test) or basic traceability (p<.05). We find no significant
difference, however, in the average willingness-to-pay for animal treatment assurances and basic
traceability for ham (p>.10). As before, subjects are willing to pay significantly more for all
attributes together in the sandwich meat (p<.Ol for each comparison), but the average bid for the
"everything" sandwich upgrade is less than the sum of the individual meat attributes.
Interestingly, similar analysis of the market price data for the ham experiments show that the
market price for the animal treatment upgrade is significantly higher than the market price for
basic traceability (p<.Ol). These results are due to some outlier subjects' high willingness to pay
for basic traceability in ham, which generates high market prices but is tempered more in the
overall average bid data.
In comparing average willingness to pay for a meat attribute in beef and pork, there is no

significant difference in subj ects' average bids for animal treatment in beef versus pork (p>.1 0
for the two-tailed Mann-Whitney test) and food safety in beef versus pork (p>.10). However,
subjects are willing to pay significantly more for basic traceability in pork than in beef (p<.Ol),

which contributes to a higher average bid for a ham sandwich with all three attributes than

a
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roast beef sandwich with all three attributes (p<.1 0). Figures 3 and 4 show the average bid
frequencies for beef and ham, respectively. While the average subject is willing to pay
significant. amounts of money for meat with these attributes, Figures 3 and 4 highlight that a
significant number of subjects-anywhere from 15% (food safety) to 55% (basic traceability) in
beef and from 21 % (food safety) to 40% (basic traceability) in pork-place a zero value on some
of the individual food attributes. As such, the conditional mean willingness-to-pay for these
quality attributes in meat is even higher for the relevant segment of the market that positively
values these attributes. The parametric regression results reported next will help highlight
whether the positive willingness-to-pay of certain consumers is general across the demographic
groups we used as experiment subjects or specific to one or more demographic group.
Table 1 reports the results of a basic treatment effects regression on average bids for ham
and beef attributes. The dependent variable in each case is the average bid from the finalS
rounds of each auction so that our analysis focuses on behavior after subject bids stabilize in the
auctions. The regression results include group-specific controls, and each group represents a
different demographic market type. The results demonstrate that specific demographic
characteristics affect the bids for both beef and ham. Students and faculty made significantly
lower bids for ham than professional staff while classified employees bid higher for ham than
professional staff. For beef, each of the other three demographic groups placed higher average
bids than the classified employees group (Table 1). These results, which are attributed to
differences in meat preferences, could be a function of educational differences. Education
(students and faculty) probably affects the level of awareness of issues related to TTA such as
BSE, a potential problem with beef, resulting in a these two groups placing a premium on
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enhanced beef characteristics relative to enhanced pork characteristics. It is also possible that
students and faculty having lower average bids for ham but higher average bids for beef could be
expressing a different characteristic(s) not directly controlled in the specific-cohort design of the
experiments.

16

Also, the range of demographic group effects on average bid prices is narrower

for beef than for pork in Table 1, implying that a specific demographic groups is a more
important determinant of bidding differences for TTA pork than beef. In either case, this
suggests that significant demographic effects exist, which implies that marketing strategies for
TTA characteristics should perhaps not be uniform across meat types.
Subjects in the ham sandwich experiment would pay the same additional amount for the
three sandwiches with individual characteristics (Sandwich 1, 2, or 3) but would pay
significantly more for a sandwich with the combined characteristics (Sandwich 4) than they
would for a sandwich with only traceability (see Table 1 and Figure 2). Conversely, subjects in
the roast beef sandwich experiment would pay more for animal welfare (Sandwich 1), food
safety (Sandwich 2), and the combined characteristics (Sandwich 4) than for traceability alone
(Sandwich 3) (Table 1 and Figure 1). This suggests perhaps a higher degree of concern about
the procedures used to produce and process beef than ham. One could surmise this result from
more highly publicized food scares in recent years being related to beef than to pork.

Discussion
Our results suggest that many consumers would be willing to pay for TTA characteristics
in red meat products. Average bids for each individual TTA characteristic as well as the

16 While the average bids of students, faculty, and professional staff were statistically above those of classified
employees for beef, the premium above classified employees is statistically equal for the three groups (i.e., a test of
the restriction for the parameter estimates for students=faculty=professional staff could not be rejected (p> 10%)).
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combined characteristics were found to be significant and positive. The potential market
segments for TTA red meat products appear to be large, which suggests that a significant
marketing opportunity might be exploited if red meat producers developed TTA products. These
results imply that U. S. consumers would be willing to pay for TTA characteristics in red meat
products meeting the criterion suggested by Wiemers for considering the implementation of
these systems.
The implementation of some sort of TTA system for red meat in the United States seems
inevitable as our trading partners and competitors move rapidly to develop such systems. While
possible TTA systems in the U.S. are being examined, and in some cases implemented, the
USDA and producer groups in the U.S. have sought evidence that TTA systems would produce a
net benefit to the industry.
Consumers in non-hypothetical auction experiments seem to value specific TTA
attributes or combinations of attributes more than just traceability or identity preservation in beef
and pork. This implies that a system of meat traceability alone may not be valued enough to
justify its creation. Systems that provide traceability can, however, provide additional
information on TTA characteristic(s) that consumers do value. The characteristic most valued by
consumers in our experiments was food safety, and so safety guarantees are likely an important
component of any profitable TTA system.
We also find some distinct results for beef and pork. Specifically, consumers seems more
willing to pay additional money for knowledge about animal treatment and additional food
safety assurances in beef than in pork-this is in addition to what consumers are willing to pay
for meat traceability information alone. Therefore, markets for specific and distinct TTA
guarantees may be worth exploring in beef. Consumers are still willing to pay for TTA

characteristics in pork, but we find less evidence for a difference in WTP for food safety and
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animal treatment guarantees versus traceability than in beef. There is also evidence that a
consumer's demographics are less a determinant of WTP for TTA beef than TTA pork. This has
important implications for any marketing strategy for TTA meat products since TTA pork may
have to be targeted to more specific consumer demographic groups than TTA beef, which may
be a broader potential market.

oUr results need to be confirmed by field trials and also do not answer the question of
how TTA systems would affect the cost structure for producing and processing red meat.
Nonetheless, our findings offer enough evidence to justify continued examination and
determination of the most effective ways for implementing TTA in the U.S. red meat system.

15
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Table 1. Regression Results for Ham and Roast Beef Depicting Differences in Bids
Different Panels and Sandwich Types. a
ItemlIndependent Variable

Ham (bid)

Beef (bid)

Observations

212

220

Adjusted R2

0.4603

0.2392

Intercept

0.943
(0.140)**

-0.017
(0.097)

-1.084
(0.154)**
-1.074
(0.148)**
0.485
(0.150)**

0.296
(0.105)**
0.230
(0.103)*
0.345
(0.103)**

0.038
((0.152)
0.127
(0.152)
0.676
(0.152)**

0.265
(0.104)*
0.375
(0.104)**
0.802
(0.104)**

Demographic Type: b
Students
Faculty
Professional Staff

Meat Characteristic(s):c
Sandwich 1 (Animal Treatment)
Sandwich 2 (Food Safety)
Sandwich 4 (Combined Characteristics)

a Standard

errors are in parentheses.
Base is professional staff.
C Base is Sandwich 3 (traceability).
* Significantly different than zero at the 5% level.
** Significantly different than zero at the 1% level.

b
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APPENDIX: Subject Instructions
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(Given verbally to entire experimental group, as well as being provided in written form)
Distinctions in beef and pork instructions are noted for brevity
INSTRUCTIONS
Today you are participating in a decision-making experiment. Please read and follow the
instructions carefully, and do not hesitate in asking any questions that you might have about the
procedures in today's experiment.
You will be asked to decide how much you would be willing to pay for meat with certain
characteristics. These characteristics include (1) whether or not information is available on the
processes and procedures used to produce the animal that provided the meat (e.g., humane treatment
of animals guaranteed, no growth hormones used, etc), (2) whether or not the meat can be traced back
to the original farm the animal came from, and (3) whether or not the meat has a higher than
average level of consumption safety. We can truthfully verify all of the characteristics of the meat
products that will be described to you today, and no deceit is being used in claiming that the products
possess the specified characteristics.
You will begin this experiment with $15 of starting income and a simple lunch, which includes
a drink, a snack, and a sandwich made with meat. There are also 4 "distinct" sandwiches on the
auction tables of this experiment. Your instructions contain a description of the distinguishing
characteristics of the meat in each of these sandwiches. We will refer to these sandwiches as sandwich
#1, #2, #3, and #4, and they are numbered this way on the auction tables. You currently own the lunch
(including the sandwich) and the $15 of starting income given to you. You will soon have the
opportunity to bid on exchanging your current meat sandwich with anyone of the 4 distinct
sandwiches. At the end of this experiment you will either eat your current meat sandwich, or you will
eat one of the distinct sandwiches. You will not own or eat more than one sandwich at the end of the
experiment. Your take-home income will be the $15 minus the value of anything purchased in the
experiment, and you must eat your experiment lunch before you can leave today with your takehome income.
When deciding upon your willingness to pay for certain distinct food characteristics, you will
be asked to record your monetary bid on a "bid sheet". Y our instruction packet includes bid sheets
(that can be torn out) for each distinct sandwich. You are not allowed to communicate in any way or
to share your bids with other participants in this experiment. Bids are private information, and you
should not attempt to discover the bids of any of the other participants in the experiment.

Sandwich bidding
Bidding in this experiment involves determining how much you would be willing to pay to
trade your current sandwich with each distinct sandwich. Ultimately, a sandwich will be auctioned off
to the highest bidder, but the high bidder will only have to pay the amount of the second highest bid to
exchange hislher current sandwich for the distinct sandwich. As such the second highest bid would be
considered the "market price" for the distinct sandwich. You will have to make these bid decisions
for each of sandwiches #1, #2, #3, and #4, and bidding will occur in 10 separate trials. Bids can be in
increments as small as one cent. At the end of each bidding trial, the reigning market price (i.e., the
second highest bid) of each sandwich will be announced, and the next trial of bidding will commence.
Only one of the trials of bidding will be binding, and the binding trial will be determined by a random
draw (each trial has an equal change of being the binding trial). Also, only one of the sandwiches will
actually be auctioned off to the highest bidder at the end of the experiment. The actual sandwich to be

auctioned off will be randomly determined at the end of the bidding after the binding trial has beenz 1
chosen (and there is an equal chance that anyone of the sandwiches will be the one actually auctioned
off).
When you write your bid for a given sandwich on the bid sheet, your bid should be the highest
amount that you would be willing to pay to exchange your current sandwich with the distinct
sandwich. Please do not state the total amount that you would pay for each distinct sandwich, but
rather the amount that you would be willing to pay to exchange your current sandwich for the distinct
sandwich. For example, if you are, at most, willing to pay $Y for your current sandwich (had it not
been given to you) and, at most, $X for the distinct sandwich #1, then the difference $X-$Y indicates
your maximum willingness to pay to exchange your current sandwich with sandwich # 1. Your bid for
sandwich #1 should then be the amount $X-$Y. If you prefer a given distinct sandwich over your
current sandwich, than your bid for that distinct sandwich should be a positive amount. However, if
you would actually prefer your current sandwich, then $X-$Y would be negative. Negative bids are
allowed, but keep in mind that you would only bid a negative amount if your maximum willingness to
pay for your current sandwich (were it not given to you) were actually higher than your maximum
willingness to pay for the distinct sandwich. If you are indifferent between your current sandwich and
a particular distinct sandwich, then your bid for that distinct sandwich should be $0.00. Remember,
only one of the bidding trials will be binding and only one of the distinct sandwiches will actually be
auctioned off, and your bids do not effect which trial is chosen as the binding trial or which sandwich
is auctioned off (it is just randomly chosen). You should therefore treat each trial ofbidding as the
potentially binding trial and each distinct sandwich as if it were the one actually being auctioned off in
terms of deciding your bid for each sandwich.
In each bidding trial, once all participants have placed their bids for each sandwich (#1, #2, #3,
and #4), the reigning market price for each sandwich will be announced before beginning the next
bidding trial. Once the last bidding trial is completed, we will randomly choose one of trials as
binding, and then we will randomly choose one of the sandwiches to auction based on the bids from
that binding trial. For the chosen auction sandwich, we will review each of the participant bids, and
the winner bidder and market price (the second highest bid) will be announced. Remember, the
individual who bid the highest amount for the auction sandwich will receive that sandwich, but he/she
will pay the second highest bid. For example, if the highest bid for the auction sandwich was $H, and
the second highest bid was $T, then the individual who bid $H must exchange hislher current sandwich
for the auction sandwich, but he/she would pay $T for the exchange. That individual would then take
home $15-$T dollars at the end of the experiment (after eating the auction sandwich lunch). All other
individuals would take home $15 at the end of the experiment (after eating the original sandwich
lunch).

Please continue on the next page for a description of the verifiable information that we have on
each of the auction sandwiches

The following brief descriptions of Sandwiches # 1, #2, #3, and #4 highlight the verifiable 22
characteristics of the meat in that sandwich. Such characteristics have not been certified and
cannot be verified for the meat in your current sandwich.
After reading the description of each of these sandwiches, please place your bid for trial # 1 for
that sandwich on the bid sheet for trial # 1. Please make sure the your bid for sandwich # 1 is placed on
the bid sheet for sandwich # 1, your bid for sandwich #2 is placed on the bid sheet for sandwich #2, etc.
When completed, you can tear off each bid sheet, fold it in half, and place it in the bid box next to that
sandwich on the auction table. Once everyone had done this, we will document the bids, announce the
reigning market price for each sandwich, and continue on to the next trial of bidding. Once the final
trial is completed, we will randomly select one of the trials to be binding, and then we will randomly
select a sandwich to be auctioned off using the bids from that trial. Again, please ask before you
place your bid if you have any questions.

Sandwich #1
Certified information is available on certain enhanced processes and procedures used to produce the
animal that provided the meat in this sandwich, and this is over and above what one would know from
typical USDA plant inspections (e.g., this meat product has assurances of extra measures taken to
ensure humane animal treatment and absence of growth hormones)
Sandwich #2
Pork: It has been certified that salmonella was not present in the animal (at the farm) that provided
the meat in this sandwich.
Beef: It has been certified that e coli was not present in the animal (at the farm) that provided the meat
in this sandwich.
Sandwich #3
Pork: The meat in this sandwich can be traced back to the farm on which the animal was produced
(i.e., we can identify the exact farm that produced the animal).
Beef: The meat in this sandwich can be traced back to the exact animal on the specific farm on which
the animal was produced (i.e., we know exactly what animal this meat product came from).
Sandwich #4
(appropriate pork and beef distinctions made)
The meat in this sandwich can be traced back to the farm on which the animal was produced (i.e., we
can identify the exact farm that produced the animal). In addition: (1) Certified information is
available on certain enhanced processes and procedures used to produce the animal that provided the
meat in this sandwich (e.g., this meat product has assurances of extra measures taken to ensure humane
animal treatment and absence or growth hormones); and (2) it has been certified that salmonella was
not present in the animal that provided the meat in this sandwich.

ALL STATEMENTS IN THE ABOVE DESCRIPTIONS ARE 100% TRUTHFUL
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ABSTRACT
This article reports the results from a series of laboratory auction markets in which
consumers bid on meat characteristics. The characteristics examined include meat traceability
(i.e., the ability to trace the retail meat back to the farm or animal or origin), transparency (e.g.,
knowing that the meat was produced without growth hormones, or knowing the animal was
humanely treated), and extra assurances (e.g., extra meat safety assurances). This laboratory
study provides non-hypothetical bid data on U. S. consumer preferences for traceability,
transparency, and assurances (TTA) in red meat at a time when the U.S. currently lags other
countries in development ofTTA meat systems. Our results suggest that U.S. consumers would
be willing to pay for such TTA meat characteristics, and the magnitude of the consumer bids
suggest a likely profitable market for development of U.S. TTA systems.
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Introduction
Recent research suggests the U.S. red meat system is falling behind many of its major
competitors and trading partners in terms of traceability, transparency, and other quality
assurances (TTA) (Liddell and Bailey (2001)). In fact, the U.S. pork system ranks last,
according to Liddell and Bailey, when compared against the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark,
Canada, Japan, and AustralialNew Zealand for TTA. Traceability is sometimes called identity
preservation and is defined in Liddell and Bailey as the ability to track the inputs used to make
food products backward to their source at different levels of the marketing chain. Transparency
refers to the public availability of information on all of the rules, procedures, and practices used
to produce a food product at each level of the marketing chain (Baines and Davies (1998); Early
(1998)).1
Quality assurance has three key elements including managing hygiene to ensure food
safety, ensuring quality through grading and other measurements, and providing mechanisms for
product recalls (Early (1998); Baines (2001)). For example, the processes for ensuring hygiene
in the European Union (EU) red-meat system has focused on Hazard Analysis Critical Control
Point (HACCP) systems2 at each point in the pork value chain beginning at the farm level.
Ensuring quality in red-meat system includes measurements of the intrinsic quality of a
carcass or product (tenderness, back fat, curing, etc.). Intrinsic quality measurements are
common to most government grading systems including the United States, its trading partners,
and competitors. However, the EU system also provides measures of the extrinsic qualities of
red meat. Extrinsic qualities do not affect either food safety or the intrinsic qualities of the meat

1 Transparency requires published procedures that are publicly available and can be influenced by input from
stakeholder groups (Liddell and Bailey (2001)).

2

product but may still affect the value of the product. Extrinsic qualities could include assurances
about animal welfare, environmental preservation, or other inputs or absence of inputs used to
3

produce the meat product (Liddell and Bailey (2001); Baines (2001)).
TTA evolved initially in response to the perceived regulatory failure of European Union
(EU) governments to provide adequate infonnation to consumers during the EU BSE (bovine
spongiform encephaiopathy)4 crisis (Baines and Davies (1998)). As a result the EU has

developed systems that enhance the credence nature of attributes such as animal welfare and
even food safety issues such as BSE by filling the perceived infonnation void inherent in
standard government grading practices with TTA.
This article presents initial evidence on U.S. consumers willingness to pay (WTP) for
TTA characteristics in beef and pork. We report the results from a series of controlled laboratory
experiments in which consumers bid in a (theoretically) demand-revealing auction on meat
sandwich upgrades. These WTP auctions, utilized first in Shogren J

eY 994b), generate non-

hypothetical data on consumer valuation of TTA attributes in meat and are a first step towards
identifying the potential U. S. market(s) for meat produced through a TTA system. We find that
consumers are willing to pay significant amounts of money to upgrade a sandwich to an
otherwise identical sandwich containing TTA attribute(s) meat. Furthennore, our results suggest
that the market for TTA beef may be broader than the market for TTA pork, as auction market

2 Codex standards emphasize hygiene and fit well into the HACCP approach for ensuring food safety. ISO 9000
standards are private labeling schemes that certify practices and procedures for a wide range of products. Capmany
et al. (2000) indicate that the United States is also lagging other countries in the adopting ISO 9000 standards.
3 An example would be the assuring the absence of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in a product. TTA i
different than typical quality assurances and standardization in its scope (tracing throughout the market chain) an 't
focus (certifies more than just food safety). For example, Codex standards emphasize hygiene. ISO 9000 stand
are private labeling schemes that certify practices and procedures for a wide range of products. TTA could serve
a basis for ISO certification if private companies decided these types of certifications were desirable. Capmany e a.
(2000) indicate that the United States is also lagging other countries in the adoption of ISO 9000 standards.

4

Also known as "mad-cow" disease.
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